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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of university licensing to explain why university license
contracts often include payment types that differ from the fixed fees and royalties typically examined
by economists. Our findings suggest that milestone payments and annual payments are common because
moral hazard, risk sharing, and adverse selection all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed.
Milestones address inventor moral hazard without the inefficiency inherent in royalties. The potential
for a licensee to shelve inventions is an adverse selection problem which can be addressed by annual
fees if shelving is unintentional, but may require an upfront fee if the firm licenses an invention with
the intention to shelve it. Whether the licensing contract prevents shelving depends in part on the university
credibly threatening to take the license back from a shelving firm. This supports the rationale for Bayh-Dole
march-in rights but also shows the need for the exercise of these rights can be obviated by contracts.
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In this paper we address the disparity between theories of licensing which focus on
simple upfront fees and royalties and recent empirical evidence on contracts. Several
surveys show that additional fees, such as those paid annually as well as fees paid
when technical or business milestones are reached, are common [Edwards et al. 2003,
Thursby et al. 2001, and Agrawal and Cockburn 2006]. Existing theories cannot
explain either the prevalence of annual fees and milestone payments or the fact that
they are typically combined with upfront fees and royalties.
We construct a model of university patent licensing in order to examine when,
if ever, it is optimal to include annual fees and/or milestone payments in a license
contract. This is an ideal setting in which to examine these contract terms, as com-
mercialization of university inventions often requires inventor and licensee e®ort in
development, neither of which is observable. The need for inventor e®ort presents a
moral hazard problem because inventors may \shirk" if they prefer research to devel-
opment. The need for licensee e®ort suggests a problem with adverse selection since
¯rms may \shelve" inventions either because their intent in licensing is simply to block
other ¯rms from developing them or, more innocently, because by the time develop-
ment is completed expected pro¯ts are less than originally anticipated. While inventor
moral hazard has been studied, albeit in the context of royalties or equity [Jensen and
Thursby 2001], shelving by licensing ¯rms has not.1 Since the intent of laws allowing
university ownership of inventions, such the US Bayh-Dole Act and Bayh-Dole-inspired
legislation in Europe [Verspagen 2006], is to promote commercialization, this is an im-
portant oversight.
We consider the problem of a Technology Licensing O±ce (TLO) with the re-
sponsibility for designing and o®ering an exclusive license contract to a ¯rm that has
expressed interest in developing an invention owned by the university. The invention
requires further inventor and licensee collaboration in technical development, as well as
licensee investment in commercialization. Importantly, we allow for the possibility of
contracts with payments based on events or quantities the TLO can observe (contract
acceptance, technical and commercial success, and output). In this context, we ana-
lyze the role that di®erent payment types play in extracting rents as well as providing
appropriate incentives to the inventor and the ¯rm.
Assuming risk neutrality, if incentive provision is not an issue, a simple upfront
fee is optimal. On the other hand, if inventor e®ort is not observable (but absent
of any concern with shelving) the TLO's optimal o®er includes payments contingent
on technical success and possibly an upfront fee. However, the optimal contract does
1Macho-Stadler et al. [2007] examine shelving by the TLO as a device to improve the quality of
inventions licensed.
2not include a royalty because it would distort the ¯rm's output. Hence, when the
licensee is genuinely interested in developing the invention, risk aversion on the part
of the TLO and the ¯rm are necessary for optimal contracts to include an upfront fee
and a royalty, although it is not su±cient. With licensee risk aversion, an optimal
contract may include an upfront fee, payments contingent on technical success (such
as milestone payments), and an output royalty.
We then examine the problem when, in the course of development, the licensee
may learn that although the invention works, the opportunity cost of investing in its
commercialization is higher than anticipated. In equilibrium, contracts include annual
fees to induce such licensees to return the license so that it can be o®ered to a ¯rm
with lower expected costs of commercialization. We also introduce the possibility of a
¯rm licensing the invention with the intent to shelve rather than develop it. We show
that upfront fees may serve a di®erent purpose here than they do in an environment in
which shelving is not considered a problem (where they merely extract rents or spread
risk). Finally, we show that payments that depend on technical success can address
the shelving problem when used in conjunction with a credible threat to license to
another ¯rm if the licensee fails to meet technical milestones de¯ned in the contract.
These results contribute to the extensive theoretical literature on licensing which
has focused primarily on simple contracts involving ¯xed fees and royalties, with little
attention paid to milestones (see Kamien [1992] for a review). Exceptions are Arora
[1995] and Bousquet et al. [1998] who discuss the role of state-contingent fees in the
transfer of tacit knowledge and risk sharing, respectively. By largely ignoring issues
related to licensing of inventions that require further development, this literature is
unable to explain the complications that arise in university licensing. For example,
in Bousquet et al. [1998] milestones are impractical for risk sharing since there are
no development milestones in their model. In Macho-Stadler et al. [1996], Jensen
and Thursby [2001], and Choi [2001], development is a single stage process. The
only evidence of success is the ¯rm's output, so that output royalties arise naturally
as a success-contingent form of payment. By contrast, when early stage inventions
are licensed, milestones are not only feasible but also may be easier to de¯ne than
royalties.2 Furthermore, although, as these studies show, royalties can address inventor
moral hazard, we show that milestone payments are preferable since they don't distort
output.
Our most novel results pertain to the adverse selection problem that arises from
shelvers having private information about their intent. Prior studies ¯nd that licensor
and/or licensee private information can be used to justify royalties [see Gallini and
Wright 1990, and Beggs 1992]. With shelving, however, royalties are ine®ective. We
show that, depending on the type of shelving and the credibility of the threat of
2See Thursby et al. 2005.
3licensing to an alternative ¯rm, fees paid upfront, annually, or with achievement of
milestones can be used.
Our work is also related to the literature on the organization of R&D with in-
complete contracts. We contribute to this literature by showing that, when shelving
is a possibility, contingent ownership combined with appropriate contract terms is
important. The work closest to ours is that of Aghion and Tirole [1994a, b] which
examines conditions under which an invention should be owned by the research unit,
¯nal customer, or some combination. They derive conditions under which ownership is
irrelevant for e±ciency. One of the conditions is whether the invention could be devel-
oped independently by the research unit or the customer. The types of inventions that
we model are those which cannot be independently developed by either the university
inventor or the ¯rm. Moreover, in their model the ¯nal customer has no incentive to
prevent development of the invention.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on university licensing and associated public
policy concerns (see Agrawal [2001] and Thursby and Thursby [2003] for reviews). In
particular, our results on shelving contribute to the US debates on the importance of
government rights to take ownership of federally funded inventions in the absence of
reasonable commercialization e®orts. These \march-in" rights, granted by the Bayh-
Dole Act, have never been exercised, leading to the view that the law needs to be
strengthened [Rai and Eisenberg 2003]. We contribute to the debate by showing that
contract terms and a willingness of universities to terminate licenses may well provide
a market mechanism to minimize shelving, thus obviating the need to exercise the
\march-in rights."
Section 2 provides survey results that motivate our consideration of multiple devel-
opment stages as well as shelving concerns. Section 3 presents the basic problem. In
Section 4, we focus on the moral hazard problem when shelving by the licensee is not
a concern. In Section 5, we consider the adverse selection problem that arises when
the ¯rm's opportunity cost of commercializing the invention is not observable by the
TLO. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains all proofs.
2 University license environment
The types of inventions and licenses we consider are motivated by two university li-
censing surveys, one of 62 US university TLOs and one of 112 ¯rms that license-in
university inventions [Thursby et al. 2001 and Thursby and Thursby 2002]. Respon-
dents to both surveys characterize the majority of inventions licensed as embryonic,
estimating that three fourths or more of these inventions are no more than a lab scale
prototype at the time of license [Jensen and Thursby 2001]. As a result, their com-
mercial use requires further development by the licensee, making shelving a potential
4issue for most inventions licensed. TLO and business respondents claimed that 71%
and 40%, respectively, of the inventions require inventor cooperation in development.
Further, since most inventions must go through substantial development and testing,
and in many cases clinical trials, this development is risky. Respondents to the business
survey reported 46% of the university inventions they license fail. Forty-seven percent
of those failed for purely technical reasons [Thursby and Thursby 2002].
Respondents to the university survey reported that three-fourths of the inventions
they license are licensed either exclusively or exclusively in a ¯eld of use.3 We therefore
focus on exclusive contracts. This is without loss of generality because shelving would
not be an issue with non-exclusive licenses since multiple licenses would be feasible for
the same use. Moreover, much of the Bayh-Dole policy debate pertains to exclusivity.
Proponents argue that without exclusivity, ¯rms would not have the incentive to risk
investing in commercializing the embryonic inventions which typically result from fed-
erally funded research. Critics, however, worry that the monopoly power associated
with exclusivity may actually stand in the way of commercialization, as in the case of
shelving.
Both surveys show that contracts typically include multiple payment types. For
example, in the university survey, 97% of the respondents reported that royalties were
included in license contracts either \almost always" or \often," 92% reported the same
for upfront fees, 89% for annual payments, and 72% for milestone payments. Only 8%
of the respondents reported often including equity, and when equity was included the
majority of contracts also included other fees [Thursby et al. 2001].
The responses to open-ended questions in the university survey suggest that fees
are often motivated by due diligence. With regard to annual payments, 19% of the
respondents volunteered that they include annual payments as due diligence to ensure
the licensee makes \reasonable e®orts to commercialize." Interestingly, one respondent
mentioned using, not annual fees, but an upfront payment when the \feasibility of
march-in to recover the license was low." Whether or not these payments indeed deter
such actions is an open question, but an additional 18% said they had problems with
¯rms shelving despite their best attempts at due diligence. In general, due diligence to
ensure licensee development appears to be a thorny issue for TLO personnel. Indeed,
78% of the respondents noted that when they had to terminate licenses, the reason
was failure to meet due diligence requirements or payments.
Both surveys include information on milestone payments. Examples of milestones
include reaching animal or clinical trials, development of a business plan or prototype,
and the level of earnings [Rector and Thursby 2008]. In response to a question on
the importance of various payment terms when inventor cooperation is critical for
3The Association of University Technology Managers Survey reports that roughly half of the
licenses executed by its members are exclusive.
5development of the technology, respondents to the business survey noted that milestone
payments are by far the most important payment term. Although the university survey
did not contain information linking milestones with inventor cooperation, respondents
emphasized that one of their most di±cult issues is maintaining the needed inventor
involvement [Thursby and Thursby 2004].
When, if ever, the use of annual and milestone payments is optimal is not clear a
priori, nor is it clear that the complex contracts in university licensing are optimal.
For these reasons, in the following sections, we set up a stylized model of university
licensing in which a TLO must design and o®er an exclusive license contract to a ¯rm
that has expressed interest in developing a university invention. The invention requires
further technical development, completion of which is impossible without the inventor's
cooperation. Commercialization of the technology also requires further investments by
the ¯rm, but the TLO has no information on the ¯rm's true intent.4
Also drawing on the university survey, we specify the TLO objective as a function,
not only of revenue, but also commercialization. All survey respondents reported
having multiple objectives including earning revenue and sponsored research, as well
as simply executing licenses and encouraging commercialization. The most important
of these objectives was earning revenue, with 98% of the respondents noting that
revenue was either moderately or extremely important to them. Next in importance
was the number of inventions commercialized, with 92% noting that commercialization
was either moderately or extremely important [Thursby et al. 2001]. Specifying the
TLO objective as a function of commercialization also has the bene¯t of linking the
analysis to the incentives provided by the \march-in" rights of Bayh-Dole.
Finally, it is worth noting that Bayh-Dole also requires universities to share a
portion of the revenue from licensing with the inventor. Revenue sharing rules vary
widely across universities, but except when the university returns all invention rights
to the inventor, the inventor share rarely approaches 100%. In our survey the inventor
share was 40% on average. From the standpoint of modeling optimal license practices,
this is interesting since a well known way to solve moral hazard problems is the so-
called \sell out" contract in which a principal sells the project to the agent and extracts
all rent with a ¯xed fee [La®ont 1989]. It is also interesting that the inventor share
is speci¯ed at the university level rather than as one of the variables in an individual
licensing decision (Jensen et al. 2003).
4This is in contrast to recent work in which the TLO serves an intermediary purpose by being
better informed than other players in the technology transfer process (Hoppe and Ozdenoren [2005],
Hellmann [2007], and Macho-Stadler et al. [2007]).
63 A model of university licensing
Consider the problem faced by a university TLO with the responsibility for licensing
an invention that requires further development before it can be successfully commer-
cialized. Our baseline model is in the spirit of Jensen and Thursby [2001]. However, we
exploit the fact that many inventions must go through multiple stages of development
before they can successfully be commercialized. In Section 5 below, we also take into
account the fact that not all of the ¯rms willing to buy the license are interested in
developing a product based on the invention.
The timing of the game is shown in Figure 1. At the beginning of the ¯rst period,
the TLO draws a ¯rm from a pool of candidates and o®ers a license contract to that
¯rm. The ¯rm may accept or reject the contract. If it accepts, a development stage
begins, in which inventor e®ort and ¯rm investment are required for technical success.
The probability of technical success at the technical development stage is given by
p(e;X) where e is inventor e®ort and X is the ¯rm's investment. We assume p(0;X) =
p(e;0) = 0 and p(e;X) 2 [0;1). The probability p(e;X) is strictly increasing in both
arguments; it is strictly concave and e and X are complements, with
@2p(e;X)
@e@X ¸ 0 for
all e ¸ 0 and X ¸ 0. If the invention is a technical success, the game proceeds to
the commercial development stage. Conditional on technical success, the probability
of commercialization is equal to zu. However, the ¯rm may invest a ¯xed amount C in
order to increase the likelihood that the invention is commercialized to z. We assume
that zu is in [0;z). Finally, all players are risk neutral.
The TLO acts on behalf of the university which owns and can exclusively license
the invention.5 In accordance with Bayh-Dole, this property right is contingent on
the licensee making \reasonable" e®orts to commercialize it and a portion, ®; of the
revenue earned from the license must accrue to the inventor. Accordingly, the TLO
maximizes utility from expected licensing revenue ~ R, UA( ~ R;L) given by
UA( ~ R;L) =
½
(1 ¡ ®) ~ Rs if commercial success;
(1 ¡ ®) ~ Rf ¡ L if commercial failure;
where ~ Rs is expected revenue in case of commercial success, ~ Rf is expected revenue in
case of commercial failure. In UA, (1 ¡ ®) is the TLO's share of revenue, and L is a
loss associated with commercial failure. Thus even if licensing revenue is certain, the
TLO strictly prefers an outcome in which the ¯rm invests in commercialization.6
5We abstract from any agency problems between the TLO and administration. See Jensen et al.
[2003] regarding the alignment of TLO and administration objectives.
6For the TLO, holding revenue constant, the presence of L induces a preference for commercializa-
tion. Because of the Bayh-Dole march-in provisions, universities face the possibility of losing property
rights to the invention in the absence of commercialization. We believe this can lead to an important
loss of reputation for the university (and thus, revenue from future licenses). This loss is accounted
7The inventor's utility from license revenue is given by UI( ~ R) = ® ~ R: She incurs
strictly positive and increasing disutility of e®ort represented by the continuous func-
tion V (e), with V (0) = 0. We also assume increasing marginal disutility (V 00(e) > 0).
Hence, the inventor's payo® function is given by ® ~ R ¡ V (e).
The TLO o®ers the ¯rm an exclusive license contract that speci¯es all payment
terms. We restrict attention to payment types that are contingent on observable events
and quantities. We denote a contract by O = (F;M;A;r;t): Payment term F is
an upfront fee paid when the ¯rm accepts the contract. Payment term M, which
we refer to as a milestone payment, is a lump sum fee paid if and only if technical
development is successful. Payment term A, which we refer to as an annual payment,
is paid along with the commercialization investment, that is, after technical success,
but before commercial success. Finally, r is an output royalty, and t is a pro¯t tax
or alternatively, a share of the ¯rm's equity.7 Hereafter, we refer to M, A, r and t as
continuation payments, since the ¯rm would have to return the license if it failed to
make either of these payments.
The ¯rm's full expected utility is given by its (random) pro¯t net of license pay-
ments. The ¯rm's pro¯t from selling a product based on the invention is equal to ¼(x)
with x denoting output. Where there is no ambiguity, we write ¼ for maxxf¼(x)g.
Clearly, in the absence of distortionary payments based on output, if the ¯rm commer-
cializes the invention, it chooses the optimal level of output and earns ¼. We assume
z¼ ¡ C > zu¼, so that the ¯rm ¯nds it worthwhile to invest C when it obtains ¼
from commercializing the invention. Thus, immediately after technical success, the
¯rm's expected pro¯t is given by ¦[x¤(r;t);r;t] = maxfz[(1¡t)¼[x¤(r;t)]¡rx¤(r;t)]¡
C;zu[(1 ¡ t)¼[x¤(r;t)] ¡ rx¤(r;t)];0g, where x¤(r;t) is the ¯rm's optimal output level
when the royalty rate is r > 0 and the equity share is equal to t.
If the ¯rm invests X at the technical development stage, and behaves optimally at
the commercialization stage, its expected payo® is given by
p(e;X)[¦[x
¤;r;t] ¡ A ¡ M] ¡ X ¡ F:
In general, inventor e®ort and ¯rm investment (e, X or C) are neither observable
nor contractible, and the inventor's share of revenue ® is not chosen by the TLO.
However, as a benchmark we consider the TLO's problem if investment and e®ort are
observable and contractible and ® is a choice variable. With full information and a
for by L in our model.
7Note that Jensen and Thursby [2001] also consider F; r; and t: Bousquet et al. [1998] consider
upfront fees and royalties only. However, they allow for two di®erent types of royalties. One is an
output royalty, and the other is a tax on the ¯rm's revenue. We focus on output royalties, which is
without loss of generality in our model. Either type of royalty implies a distortion of the licensee's
output, which is what matters for our results. Because of the way we model uncertainty at the
commercialization stage, the distinction between the two di®erent types of royalties is inconsequential.
8°exible ®, the TLO maximizes its expected payo® by choosing payment terms, required
e®ort and investment, and the inventor's share of revenue subject to the inventor's and
the ¯rm's participation constraints. Since the required e®ort and investment levels
can be written in a contract independently of payment terms, as in Choi [2001], a
contract with a simple upfront fee is su±cient.8 At an interior solution with e > 0 and
X > 0, the optimal values of ® and of the upfront fee are such that the ¯rm's and the
inventor's participation constraints are binding.9
4 Non-contractible e®ort and investment
Our university survey revealed that TLO personnel view obtaining faculty participation
as one of the more challenging parts of their jobs [Thursby et al. 2001 and Jensen et
al. 2003]. Jensen and Thursby [2001] show that obtaining inventor e®ort requires some
type of payment tied to commercial success, such as royalties or equity. In their model,
there is a single development stage so there is no role for milestone payments. In this
section, we show that when development milestones are feasible, a payment tied to
their achievement can solve the problem of inventor moral hazard.
As in Jensen and Thursby's [2001] model with sponsored research, we assume that
after the ¯rm accepts the contract, the inventor and the ¯rm choose their e®ort and
investment levels simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Thus, e®ort and investment
are determined in the Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous move game. In this section,
we abstract from shelving and assume the ¯rm has a natural incentive to invest because
its only source of revenue is the pro¯t from commercialization. However, the inventor
solves:
Maximize ® ~ R ¡ V (e) with respect to e:
It is clear that the expected utility term will not depend on e if the reward ® ~ R is the
same whether or not the invention works because, under Bayh-Dole, ®F must be paid
to the inventor whether or not the invention works.10 However, in our set-up, there
8With risk neutrality, any single non-distortionary payment type or combination of payment types
may be used to extract the optimal amount of revenue from the ¯rm, because the required e®ort
and investment levels are speci¯ed in the contract. Hence, to implement the ¯rst-best levels of e®ort
and investment, the only payment type that is ruled out is an output royalty because it implies a
dead-weight loss.
9Under certain conditions, the solution to the TLO's maximization problem described in the text
coincides with the solution that is obtained if the TLO sets ® = 1 and sells the project to the inventor
for a ¯xed price (a sell-out contract). We examine this possibility in the Appendix. The solutions
will coincide if, (i) with the sell-out contract, the inventor, not the TLO, bears the loss L in case the
invention is not commercialized and (ii) the inventor is willing to accept the sell-out contract without
subsidization by the TLO.
10As an anonymous referee pointed out, if the TLO could make ® contingent on technical success,
then it could o®er an upfront fee contract, and set ® = 0 in case of technical failure and ® > 0 in case
9are a wide variety of payment terms that are received by the university (and thus, the
inventor) only if the invention is either technically or commercially successful. We show
that an optimal contract will contain at least one such payment type when feasible.
As in other licensing models, the optimal contract may also include an upfront fee to
extract any residual rent from the ¯rm.
Proposition 1 Suppose that all parties are risk neutral and that neither inventor ef-
fort, nor ¯rm investment are contractible. Then, if an optimal licensing contract that
leads to positive inventor e®ort and ¯rm investment exists, it contains at least one con-
tinuation payment type tied to technical success. Furthermore, the optimal contract is
not unique regarding payment types. However, in all optimal contracts, the output roy-
alty rate r is set equal to zero and the upfront fee is set so that the ¯rm's participation
constraint is binding.
Given the complementarity of the inventor's e®ort and the ¯rm's investment, there
is another equilibrium in the technical development subgame in which the ¯rm does
not invest and the inventor spends no e®ort so that the project fails with probability
one. As in Jensen and Thursby's [2001] analysis of moral hazard with royalties and
sponsored research, it is straightforward to show that this equilibrium is unstable with
standard assumptions on the ¯rm's and inventor's problems. We therefore restrict our
attention to the equilibrium with positive e®ort.11
As shown in Proposition 1, in our simple model, if an equilibrium with non-zero
probability of development exists, the speci¯c payment terms do not matter as long
as a su±cient portion of the total payments to the TLO is contingent on technical
success and the output royalty rate is set equal to zero.12 There are several ways, not
of technical success to provide incentives to the inventor.
11We do not examine the case p(0;X) > 0 for X > 0 and the possibility to obtain additional e®ort
from the inventor in this paper. If the ¯rm earns a pro¯t of zero when it does not commercialize (that
is, it does not have an incentive to shelve) and inventor e®ort is not necessary, then the TLO always has
the option of o®ering a contract with a simple upfront fee and foregoing the inventor's participation.
Note that the TLO would still be required to transfer a share ® of revenue to the inventor even if
the inventor spends no e®ort. The TLO's other option is to provide an incentive for the inventor
to work, via continuation payments like in our model. The optimal contract is thus determined by
a comparison between the contract that maximizes the TLO's expected payo® conditional on zero
inventor e®ort and the best contract that induces positive inventor e®ort. Hence, if the probability of
success is non-zero even when the inventor does not participate, the TLO faces a trade-o® between,
on the one hand, letting the ¯rm develop the invention on its own and on the other hand, introducing
payment terms that distort its investment in order to motivate the inventor. This trade-o® depends on
the degree of complementarity between inventor e®ort and ¯rm investment. In Section 5, we examine
a game between the TLO and the ¯rm and focus on the moral hazard problem that arises when some
¯rms have an incentive to shelve the invention.
12The conditions on the inventor's and the ¯rm's best-replies that are required for the existence
and uniqueness of an equilibrium in which inventor e®ort and ¯rm investment are strictly positive are
similar to equation (15) in Jensen and Thursby [2001] after adjusting for notational di®erences.
10modeled here, to explain why milestone payments are prevalent. One such explanation
is discounting of future payo®s by the inventor and the TLO. Since we assume that the
TLO makes a take-it-or-leave it o®er to the ¯rm, even a small preference for current
payo®s would make it optimal for the TLO to set A = 0 and t = 0 and charge all
continuation fees in the form of a technical milestone. A similar argument can be
made if either the TLO or the inventor, or both, are risk averse, while the ¯rm is risk
neutral.
An important result is that, when all players are risk neutral, the milestone payment
dominates a royalty. Why then do we observe contracts that include royalties and
upfront fees in addition to milestones and annual fees? With uncertainty related to
commercialization, Bousquet el al. [1998] show risk aversion on the part of the ¯rm
explains the presence of output-distorting royalties. If, as they do, we assume that
equity contracts are not feasible, then risk aversion is a natural explanation given the
embryonic nature of university inventions. In our model, once the ¯rm invests C, it
obtains ¦[x¤(r;t);r;t] either with probability z < 1 or with probability zu < 1, so that
the worst state of nature for the ¯rm is one in which the invention is a technical success
but commercial success is not realized. In this case, the ¯rm anticipates having to pay
the milestone payment and the annual fee, while earning no revenue from the invention.
A positive royalty rate will reduce the variance in the distribution of pro¯ts and result
in more equal payments across states. With a risk neutral TLO and inventor, this
leaves open the possibility that the optimal contract will include an output royalty
when z is su±ciently low.13
5 Shelving
In this section, we examine the problems that arise because the ¯rm's commercializa-
tion e®ort is not contractible. We consider situations in which the ¯rm may be better
o® shelving the invention than commercializing it. We allow for two types of shelving,
one in which a ¯rm licenses with the intent to prevent commercialization of the inven-
tion and another in which a ¯rm licenses intending to commercialize the invention, but
decides not to commercialize it after spending time on development. For simplicity,
we refer to the ¯rst type of shelving as intentional and to the second as unintentional.
The motivation for intentional shelving is similar to that of \sleeping patents"
examined by Gilbert and Newbery [1982] in which a monopolist patents substitutes for
13If the ¯rm's investment can take only two values, 0 or X and the probability of technical success is
given by p(e;X) = p(e) and p(e;0) = 0, it is possible to show the following. If there exists a contract
with M > 0 and r = 0 that leads to positive inventor e®ort and is accepted by the ¯rm, then a small
increase in r compensated by an equivalent reduction in M will increase the expected payo® of the
¯rm without a®ecting the probability of success. Hence, increasing r allows the TLO to increase the
upfront fee and thus, its expected payo®.
11its product to keep others from producing it. Well known examples include DuPont's
patenting of 200 substitutes for Nylon. More recently, Cohen et al. [2000] ¯nd that
when ¯rms in their survey patent inventions, 82% (64%) patent them in order to block
rivals in the case of product (process) inventions.
The most publicized example of unintentional shelving was involved in the CellPro-
Johns Hopkins march-in dispute. In 1997 CellPro petitioned the National Institutes
of Health to take back the Johns Hopkins license for the My-10 antibody originally
licensed to Becton Dickinson. While the company had invested in development, over
time it decided to withdraw from the therapeutic business, so that developing the
antibody had no economic value to the company.
5.1 The Shelving Game
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, but rich enough that it generates
insight into the shelving problem, we assume that the probability of success depends
only on the ¯rm's investment. That is, we assume the probability of technical success
is equal to p if the ¯rm invests a ¯xed amount X > 0 and zero if the ¯rm does not
invest. Without loss of generality, we set ® = 0 and z = 1. Finally, to keep the notation
simple, we rule out output royalties since we assume that the players are risk neutral
(and equity contracts are feasible). It will also become clear that payments which
depend on commercialization are ine®ective at solving the shelving problem since they
are not paid by shelving ¯rms.
We introduce the possibility of shelving in the following way. At the time the TLO
o®ers a license contract, there are two types of ¯rms in the pool. With probability s
the ¯rm is interested in licensing the invention to prevent development (either by itself
or a rival). It is natural to think of this ¯rm either producing or trying to develop a
substitute for the invention. The ¯rm, which we call an intentional shelver, earns pro¯t
¼m when it obtains the license for the invention but does not commercialize it, and
¼c · ¼m, if it obtains the license and commercializes it. The shelver earns ¼d · ¼m if
another ¯rm, holding the exclusive license, commercializes the invention. Therefore, a
shelver would never attempt to commercialize the invention since maxfzu¼c;¼c¡Cg <
¼m by assumption. Moreover, a shelver saves an amount D ´ ¼m¡¼d when it obtains
and shelves the license, preventing commercialization of the invention.
At the time the TLO o®ers the contract, the probability that the ¯rm is interested
in developing and commercializing the invention is 1 ¡ s: However, we assume that
after technical success is determined but before the decision to incur C is made, new
information becomes available which reveals whether the commercial potential for the
invention is good or bad. With probability q, commercial potential is good and the
¯rm's pro¯t from commercializing is equal to ¼. With probability 1 ¡ q, the ¯rm is
12an unintentional shelver whose investment in commercialization has to be increased to
Cu > C to ensure that the probability of commercialization is equal to 1. This could be
because technical success has revealed that this invention is not as pro¯table as other
development projects the licensee is working on concurrently.14 Moreover, we assume
that zu¼ > ¼ ¡ Cu holds, so that an unintentional shelver ¯nds it too costly to invest
in commercial development and thus faces a lower probability of commercialization zu.
If a ¯rm is not an intentional shelver, following technical success but before it learns
its type, its expected pro¯t is equal to ^ z¼ ¡ qC, where ^ z ´ q + (1 ¡ q)zu.
The timeline for this game is given in Figure 2. The TLO ¯rst o®ers a contract to
a ¯rm that was randomly selected from the pool. If it rejects, the TLO must decide
whether or not to search for a second ¯rm at a cost K > 0. The second ¯rm may
accept or reject the contract. If it rejects the contract, we assume that the project
is abandoned. Thus, we assume that the TLO can search only once. If the ¯rst ¯rm
accepts, it pays an upfront fee and decides whether or not to invest X. If the observed
outcome of the technical development stage is a failure, the TLO can take the license
back from the ¯rm. Note that failure will be observed when either the ¯rm does not
invest or the invention does not work. If the TLO takes the license back, it decides
whether or not to search for a second ¯rm at cost K. The outcome of the search process
is as described above. On the other hand, if technical development is successful, the
licensee must pay the milestone payment. If the ¯rm is not an intentional shelver,
it also learns its type (its commercial development cost). Upon learning the cost of
commercial development, if the ¯rm decides to keep the license, it must pay the annual
fee. Otherwise, it returns the license to the TLO which can search for another ¯rm at
the cost K. If the ¯rm decides to keep the license, it then decides whether or not to
invest.
There are three critical dates at which the TLO may want to search for a di®erent
¯rm: immediately after the initial contract o®er is made if it is rejected, immediately
after observed failure in the technical development stage, and, ¯nally, after technical
success if the TLO determines that the ¯rm is an unintentional shelver. The infor-
mation available to a potential second ¯rm about the ¯rst ¯rm's investment plays an
important role in this context. To abstract from potential agency problems between
the TLO and the second ¯rm, we assume that the second ¯rm has the same information
as the TLO.
Throughout the analysis, we focus on contracts that can be supported as pure strat-
egy Perfect Bayesian equilibria within the class of contracts that, ¯rst, are accepted
by ¯rms that are not intentional shelvers, and second, lead to positive investment in
14For instance, suppose that the licensee learned that another one of its innovations would surely
be commercially successful and yield a pro¯t net of development costs equal to ¼u. If the licensee
has limited resources, and can only work on one of the two projects, then the opportunity cost of
investing C in the university invention is C + ¼u = Cu.
13technical development by such ¯rms. A contract can be supported as an equilibrium
if there is no other contract that satis¯es all participation and incentive compatibility
constraints and gives the TLO a strictly higher expected payo®. Hence, an equilibrium
contract is optimal for the TLO, subject to participation and incentive compatibility
constraints. For the problem to be interesting, we assume
A0: p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X > 0
If A0 is not satis¯ed, ¯rms that are not intentional shelvers are unwilling to accept
any contract which generates strictly positive revenue.
To characterize equilibrium contracts, it is necessary to analyze the TLO's behavior
if the ¯rst ¯rm rejects the original contract o®er. In this case, the TLO may try to
license the invention to a second ¯rm. If the TLO searches for a second ¯rm, then it
will optimally extract all rents from this ¯rm by o®ering, for instance, an upfront fee
contract. If the ¯rm accepts the contract and is not an intentional shelver, its expected
payo® gross of payments to the TLO is
p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X:
Hence, a contract o®er of O = (F) to this ¯rm, where F = p(^ z¼¡qC)¡X, maximizes
the TLO's expected payo®. A simple calculation shows that the TLO will search for a
second ¯rm if and only if
(1 ¡ s)[p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X] + (1 ¡ s)p^ zL ¸ K: (1)
Since our premise is that the TLO views shelving as a problem we make the fol-
lowing assumption:
A1: The TLO's utility loss from failing to commercialize the invention and the cost
of search satisfy (1 ¡ s)[p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X ¡ p^ zD] + (1 ¡ s)p^ zL ¸ K.
Since D > 0, A1 is stronger than (1). This assumption rules out the TLO ¯nding
it pro¯table to o®er an upfront fee contract to an intentional shelver. To see this,
suppose the TLO knows the ¯rm's type and is faced with an intentional shelver. The
assumption implies that the TLO prefers to turn that ¯rm down and search for another
¯rm rather than extract all rents from the shelver and commit not to take the license
back after observing technical failure.
For some, but not all, of our results, we also assume
A2: ^ z¼ ¡ qC ¸ (1 ¡ s)D.
14This condition guarantees that if technical development is a success, the expected
pro¯t from commercialization for a ¯rm that is not an intentional shelver is greater
than the amount an intentional shelver expects to save by blocking commercialization.
5.2 Unintentional shelving: The role of annual fees
In this section, we assume s = 0 and focus on the problem presented by unintentional
shelving. Consider the incentives faced by a licensee that is not an intentional shelver.
Since, ex-ante, the ¯rm does not know the value of the licensed invention, it expects to
earn a gross expected pro¯t equal to ^ z¼ ¡C if technical development yields a success.
The problem is that when ^ z < 1 the TLO may want to take the license back even if
technical development is successful. The TLO's incentive to take the license back from
an unintentional shelver stems from the opportunity to license to a second ¯rm, which
on average, will have a higher probability of commercialization. It is thus important to
determine when it is optimal for the TLO to license to a second ¯rm after it observes
a technical success with the ¯rst ¯rm.
Suppose technical development is successful, but the licensee learns that zu¼ >
¼ ¡ Cu so that it is not pro¯table to invest in commercialization. Then if (1) holds
with s = 0, it is simple to show that the TLO will always ¯nd it worthwhile to search
for a second ¯rm. This additional search cannot be done with the ¯rst ¯rm holding an
exclusive license unless the license is terminated. To justify termination, the TLO may
include another type of contract requirement before commercialization. Suppose that
the TLO's contract includes an annual fee A > 0 to be paid after technical success,
but before commercial success. If this payment is su±ciently high, speci¯cally greater
than an unintentional shelver's expected pro¯t, zu¼, then a ¯rm of that type will prefer
to return the license to the TLO to avoid making this payment.
The tradeo® faced by the TLO is the following. Setting A ¸ zu¼ brings about
an obvious bene¯t. Indeed, if the ¯rst ¯rm is an unintentional shelver who returns
the license, the TLO gets a chance to search for a second ¯rm, which, on average
has a higher probability of commercialization. This bene¯t increases as zu decreases.
However, forcing unintentional shelvers to return the license is costly. First, the revenue
raised from the ¯rst ¯rm is necessarily lower than if the licensee anticipates keeping
the license regardless of its type. This cost increases as zu increases. Second, search
itself is costly. The next proposition shows that if annual fees are feasible, then it is
optimal for the TLO to include an annual fee if and only if q is su±ciently high and
zu is su±ciently low.
15Proposition 2 Assume s = 0 and suppose A0 and (1) hold.
(i) If q · X
p(¼¡C) < 1, then the ¯rm will reject any contract with an annual fee
A ¸ zu¼.
(ii) If q > X
p(¼¡C) holds, there exists a ^ zu > 0 such that a contract that contains an
annual fee A is optimal if and only if zu 2 (0; ^ zu]. The annual fee must be no
less than zu¼ and no greater than ^ A where ^ A ´ (¼ ¡ C) ¡ X
pq. In equilibrium,
the ¯rm accepts the TLO's contract and invests X, but returns the license to the
TLO if it learns that it is an unintentional shelver.
In our model, the distinction between annual fees and technical milestone payments
is somewhat arti¯cial. Annual fees are paid along with the commercial development
cost, while technical milestones are paid immediately following technical success. An
interpretation of our simple timing assumption is that in order for the ¯rm to learn
about the commercial potential it must undertake commercial development, as would
be the case with market testing, for example. However, the ¯rm is committed to pay
the milestone payment immediately upon technical success so that annual continuation
fees to be paid at a later date are required to ensure due diligence. Clearly, whether
the TLO decides to enforce due diligence by including such annual fees will depend on
the revenue it has to forego as shown in Proposition 2.
In solving the problem with unintentional shelving, it is clear that annual payments
dominate output royalties since royalties distort output. Furthermore, it is possible
to show that annual payments dominate equity shares. Indeed, equity shares will
negatively a®ect a non-shelver's investment in commercial development since they are
paid only if commercial success occurs. Our model provides an extreme example of this
e®ect. Consider the equity share that is su±cient to deter unintentional shelvers from
maintaining the license. Here, the equity share equals 1 since unintentional shelvers face
no cost from commercial development. But then, this means that a non-shelver earns
a pro¯t of zero from commercializing the invention and thus will optimally invest zero
in either commercial or technical development. An annual payment does not generate
any such adverse e®ects.
5.3 Intentional shelving: The role of upfront fees and contin-
uation payments
In this section, we consider the case where unintentional shelving is not an issue (q = 1),
but s > 0 so that some ¯rms in the pool are intentional shelvers. The problem with
intentional shelvers is that if such a ¯rm obtains the license, it de¯nitely will not
invest in commercial development. Thus, if the licensee is an intentional shelver, the
16TLO incurs the loss L with certainty if it allows the ¯rm keep the license until the
commercialization stage. Our analysis highlights the role of upfront fees and technical
continuation payments along with the credibility to threaten to license to another ¯rm
if a technical failure is observed.
If types were observable, the TLO would simply select a non-shelver from the pool
and o®er, for instance, a simple upfront fee contract ^ O = ( ^ F) that extracts an amount
of revenue equal to
^ F ´ p(¼ ¡ C) ¡ X
from the ¯rm. The probability of commercialization would be equal to p, and the
TLO's expected payo® would be p(¼ ¡ C) ¡ X ¡ (1 ¡ p)L.
With unobservable types, we assume that the TLO can o®er two types of contracts,
separating or pooling, and determine when each type of contract can be supported in
a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We call a separating contract one that is accepted
by non-shelvers and rejected by shelvers, while a pooling contract is one that is ac-
cepted by both types of ¯rms. An equilibrium contract is a contract, either separating
or pooling, that maximizes the TLO's expected payo® and satis¯es all participation
and incentive compatibility constraints. For a wide range of parameter values, an
equilibrium contract is straightforward to characterize and consists of an upfront fee
(Propositions 3 and 4). However, in the most interesting case, where the TLO can
credibly threaten to license the invention to a second ¯rm after observing a technical
failure, if the bene¯t from blocking commercialization is high enough for intentional
shelvers, the TLO will o®er a pooling contract that consists of success-contingent fees
only (Proposition 5). In every equilibrium, expected licensing revenue to the TLO is
less than or equal to ^ F, and the probability of commercialization is strictly less than
p.
Since A1 implies that (1) holds (after setting ^ z = 1), it is clear that if the ¯rst ¯rm
rejects the contract, the TLO will search for a second ¯rm. This has an important
implication for equilibrium behavior as summarized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 An equilibrium in which both shelvers and non-shelvers accept the TLO's
contract and invest X in technical development does not exist.
Proof. Suppose that an equilibrium exists in which both types of ¯rms invest X. We
show that shelvers have an incentive to deviate, contradicting equilibrium behavior.
Indeed, upon observing a technical failure, both the TLO and a potential second ¯rm's
beliefs should assign probability one to the event that the invention does not work.
Hence, a second ¯rm will not be willing to invest, so that it cannot be worthwhile for
the TLO to search for a second ¯rm. But, anticipating this behavior by the TLO,
shelvers will shirk so as to strictly increase their payo®, contradicting equilibrium be-
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Hence, if an equilibrium exists, it must either be the case that shelvers reject the
TLO's contract or that they accept it, but shirk at the technical stage. In the case
shelvers accept the contract, there are two possibilities if the TLO observes a technical
failure: Either the TLO ¯nds it pro¯table to search for a second ¯rm or it does not
and the game ends.
As shown in Proposition 3, a contract that shelvers reject in equilibrium exists if
and only if ^ F exceeds the expected saving to the ¯rm from shelving. If ^ F is lower than
the expected saving from shelving, then a separating contract cannot be an equilibrium
contract since shelvers would ¯nd it pro¯table to deviate, accept the contract, and pay
any fees that non-shelvers are willing to pay. Note that the separating contract under
asymmetric information leads to a lower probability of commercialization than under
complete information.
Proposition 3 Assume q = 1 and suppose that A0 and A1 hold. An equilibrium
contract is a separating contract if and only if ^ F ¸ (1¡s)pD. The equilibrium contract
is not unique, but one such contract consists of a simple upfront fee equal to ^ F.
In equilibrium, non-shelvers accept the TLO's contract and invest X in technical de-
velopment. Shelvers turn down the TLO's contract o®er. Furthermore, the probability
of successful commercialization is equal to (1 ¡ s)p + s(1 ¡ s)p.
In the remainder of this section, we assume that ^ F < (1 ¡ s)pD holds. That is, a
non-shelver's expected payo® gross of licensing fees is less than a shelver's expected sav-
ing from blocking commercialization. This implies the following relationship between
the parameters
(1 ¡ s)pD > p(¼ ¡ C) ¡ X: (2)
In this case, Proposition 3 implies that a separating contract equilibrium does not
exist. Thus, given the result in Lemma 1, we may now focus on equilibrium contracts
that both types of ¯rms accept. We maintain assumption A1 and focus on equilibria
in which non-shelvers invest X, while shelvers do not invest in technical development.
Suppose such an equilibrium pooling contract exists. Recall that the TLO has the
option to search for a second ¯rm upon observing technical failure with the ¯rst ¯rm.
If the TLO searches for a second ¯rm, then, using Bayes rule, that ¯rm's posterior
belief that the invention failed because the ¯rst ¯rm did not invest is given by
¹ = Pr(Investment = 0jFailure) =
s
s + (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ p)
:
Hence, the second ¯rm's gross expected payo® from investing X in technical develop-
ment is equal to ¹p(¼ ¡C)¡X. A second ¯rm that is a non-shelver will be willing to
18invest in development at this stage if and only if
¹p(¼ ¡ C) ¡ X ¸ 0: (3)
The maximum amount the second ¯rm will be willing to pay for the license is equal to
the left-hand side of (3), which we denote by ^ F2. It follows that the TLO will search
for a second ¯rm if and only if
^ F2 ¸ 0 and (1 ¡ s)[ ^ F2 + ¹pL] ¸ K: (4)
We can now show that if (4) does not hold, then there exists a unique pooling contract
supported by an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proposition 4 Assume q = 1. Suppose that A0, A1 and ^ F < (1 ¡ s)pD hold, but
that the threat to license to a second ¯rm after observing a technical failure is not
credible, that is, (4) does not hold. Then, in the unique equilibrium, the TLO o®ers a
pooling contract with a simple upfront fee ^ F.
In equilibrium, both non-shelvers and shelvers accept the TLO's contract, non-
shelvers invest X in technical development, while shelvers shirk. Furthermore, the
probability of successful commercialization is equal to (1 ¡ s)p.
Now suppose instead that (4) holds and that the TLO o®ers a contract consisting
of a simple upfront fee F1 to the ¯rst ¯rm. Using Lemma 1, if an equilibrium pooling
contract exists, then, in equilibrium, a shelver that accepts the contract shirks at the
technical stage. In such an equilibrium, the TLO will search for a second ¯rm upon
observing a technical failure. Thus a shelver recognizes ex ante that its gross expected
payo® from accepting the contract, but shirking at the technical stage, is equal to
(1 ¡ s)p¼
d + [1 ¡ (1 ¡ s)p]¼
m;
which is also equal to its payo® from rejecting the contract. On the other hand, if the




It follows that, for the TLO's belief that shelvers accept the contract and shirk to be
correct ex-post, two conditions must hold. First, the upfront fee must be such that a
shelver is no worse o® accepting the contract and shirking than rejecting the contract.
That is, the upfront fee must satisfy
F1 · (1 ¡ s)[p ¡ p]D = 0: (5)
19Second, it must be the case that a shelver that accepted the contract does not ¯nd it
pro¯table to deviate and invest X in technical development. Hence,
¼
m ¡ X · (1 ¡ s)p¼
d + [1 ¡ (1 ¡ s)p]¼
m
must hold as well, which implies
(1 ¡ s)pD · X:
Constraint (5) immediately implies that a contract with a positive upfront fee
cannot be part of an equilibrium. Given that the TLO cannot commit not to license to
a second ¯rm upon technical failure if it is pro¯table to do so, (5) implies that shelvers
will not be willing to pay a positive upfront fee and shirk since this is worse than
rejecting the contract. Further, by Lemma 1, an equilibrium cannot involve shelvers
accepting the contract and investing X.
We now show that in equilibrium the TLO will o®er a contract containing technical
continuation payments such as a technical milestone or annual fees, but no upfront
fee. The continuation payments are set so that non-shelvers are indi®erent between
accepting and rejecting the contract, a level that turns out to be su±ciently high to
deter shelvers from investing X. By shirking, shelvers avoid these payments. Finally,
if a technical failure is observed, the TLO takes the license back from the ¯rst ¯rm
and searches for a second ¯rm.
Proposition 5 Assume q = 1. Suppose that A0, A1, A2, ^ F < (1 ¡ s)pD and (4)
hold. Then, an equilibrium contract is a pooling contract that consists of technical
continuation payments only and does not include an upfront fee. The expected value of
the sum of continuation payments is equal to ^ S, where ^ S ´ (¼¡C)¡ X
p . Furthermore,
technical milestone payments and annual fees combined must add up to no less than
maxf(1 ¡ s)D ¡
p
X;0g < ^ S and the equity share must be less than ^ t ´ 1 ¡ C
(z¡zu)¼.
In equilibrium, both non-shelvers and shelvers accept the TLO's contract. Non-
shelvers invest X in technical development, while shelvers shirk. Upon observing a
technical failure, the TLO searches for a second ¯rm. Finally, the probability of suc-
cessful commercialization is equal to (1 ¡ s)p + s(1 ¡ s)p.
Proposition 5 can be interpreted as a signaling result. If the TLO o®ered a contract
with an upfront fee, then the threat of licensing to a second ¯rm upon technical failure
would not be credible because shelvers would reject the TLO's contract. However, by
o®ering a contract without an upfront fee but a set of high continuation payments, the
TLO can guarantee that all types of ¯rms will accept the contract. The TLO is then
in a position to credibly argue to a second ¯rm that a technical failure may well have
resulted from lack of investment rather than a bad invention.
20If assumption A2 is relaxed, then a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. Indeed,
in this case, the pooling contracts in Proposition 5 are not immune to deviations by a
shelver. If A2 does not hold and the continuation payments are set su±ciently high
to deter shelvers, then the contract is too costly for non-shelvers to accept.
5.4 Both types of shelving
So far, our analysis has considered intentional shelving and unintentional shelving
separately. When both types of shelving are possible, overall, most of the results are
qualitatively similar. However, there is a di®erence that is worth emphasizing. It arises
when the inequality F ´ pq(¼ ¡ C ¡ zu¼) ¡ X ¸ (1 ¡ s)p^ zD as well as conditions
similar to those in Proposition 2(ii) hold. Proposition 6 below shows that annual and
upfront fees may be included together in an optimal contract when both intentional
and unintentional shelving are possible.
Proposition 6 Suppose that A0, A1, F ¸ (1 ¡ s)p^ zD. Then, there exists a ^ z0
u >
0 such that if zu 2 (0; ^ z0
u], the separating contract, O = (F;A) = (F;zu¼), is an
equilibrium contract. Furthermore, for such values of zu, F ¸ F > 0 and A ¸ zu¼ > 0
in all equilibrium separating contracts. In equilibrium, non-shelvers accept the TLO's
contract, invest X in technical development, but return the license to the TLO if they
learn that they are unintentional shelvers. Intentional shelvers turn down the TLO's
contract o®er. Finally, the probability of successful commercialization is equal to (1 ¡
s)p[q + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ s)^ z] + s(1 ¡ s)p^ z.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is simple. The TLO has to deal with two is-
sues related to shelving. On the one hand, keeping intentional shelvers out requires a
su±ciently high upfront fee, while on the other hand, making sure that unintentional
shelvers return the license in time requires an annual fee no lower than A = zu¼. Hence,
a contract that includes the minimal annual fee zu¼ and an upfront fee that extracts a
non-shelver's expected rent is optimal. The contract O is not the unique equilibrium
contract. In fact there are other separating contracts that can be supported as equi-
libria. However, it is important to note that all such contracts must include a strictly
positive upfront fee as well as an annual fee no lower than zu¼. Furthermore, when
comparing Proposition 6 to Proposition 2, note that in Proposition 6, the condition
F ¸ (1 ¡ s)p^ zD > 0 is substituted for the assumption q > X
p(¼¡C) in Proposition 2.
5.5 Shelving with inventor e®ort
We have abstracted from inventor moral hazard in this section to highlight the e®ect of
shelving on optimal contracts. A previous version of this paper contains propositions
21similar to Propositions 2-5 if inventor e®ort and shelving are both issues (see Thursby
et al., 2005). It is clear that whenever continuation payments are invoked to solve the
shelving problem, they also help provide incentives for inventor e®ort. Thus, a result
similar to that of Proposition 2 in the presence of unintentional shelvers holds when
inventor participation is required.
Importantly, we show that a contract similar to the signaling contract of Proposition
5 is also optimal when the incentive to shelve is su±ciently pronounced. The intuition
is simple. The TLO can use continuation payments both to motivate the inventor
and to prevent shelvers from investing but shelving in the commercialization stage.
However, for values of the parameters similar to those described by the assumptions in
Propositions 3 and 4, the critical di®erence between situations in which inventor e®ort
is required and the analysis in this paper is that to motivate the inventor, the TLO
is forced to o®er continuation payments that are contingent on success. This implies
a loss of revenue whenever the contract is a pooling contract because shelvers fail to
make these payments.
5.6 Shelving without inventor e®ort, but continuous invest-
ment
Another important assumption in our simple shelving game is the ¯rm's discrete in-
vestment choice. Relaxing this assumption will a®ect the results in Propositions 2
and 5. Indeed, continuation payments provide a disincentive for investment in tech-
nical development and thus lead to lower probabilities of technical success with the
¯rst licensee. This implies that with continuous ¯rm investment, forcing unintentional
shelvers to give back the license is more costly than under discrete investment. The
annual fee necessary to separate unintentional shelvers from non-shelvers reduces the
optimal value of X with the ¯rst licensee. Thus the range of parameter values under
which it is optimal to include an annual fee is not as wide as that investment is discrete.
Relaxing the discrete investment assumption also a®ect the result in Proposition 5
for the following reasons. First, contrary to Proposition 5, when the incentive to shelve
is su±ciently pronounced and the threat to license to a second ¯rm in case of technical
failure may be credible, the TLO's contract may still include a positive upfront fee in
addition to continuation payments. A constraint similar to equation (5) arises, but
the critical value of the upfront fee is not zero with continuous investment because the
expected payo® to a shelver from accepting the TLO's contract and shirking is strictly
higher than its expected payo® from turning down the o®er. This follows because a
second ¯rm that obtains the license after observing a technical failure will invest less
than a second ¯rm that obtains the license after the ¯rst ¯rm turns down the TLO's
o®er. Second, an existence problem arises because the level of continuation payments
22needed to deter shelvers may be too high for a non-shelver to be willing to invest.
6 Conclusion
University-industry technology transfer is an important part of national innovation
systems and one fraught with incentive problems, largely because of the informational
asymmetries and investment needed for industrial application of many university in-
ventions. In this paper, we focus on the role of contracts, and in particular the form
of payments in overcoming these distortions. We show that in the presence of moral
hazard and adverse selection, simple contracts are unlikely to be optimal. Interestingly,
continuation payments such as milestones or annual fees, which have largely been ig-
nored in the literature, may be used not only to solve moral hazard problems with the
inventor, but also to deal with licensee shelving.
By assuming that several stages of development must be completed before an in-
vention can be commercialized, our model accounts for an important characteristic of
university licensing, namely the embryonic nature of university inventions. We show
that when development requires both ¯rm investment and inventor participation, but
these inputs are not observable, payments tied to the achievement of technical mile-
stones, or continuation payments, are necessary to obtain inventor cooperation. When
inventor participation is not required, but shelving is a concern, continuation payments
may also be optimal.
In our model of ¯rm shelving, the TLO o®ers a contract to a ¯rm that is either
one of two unobservable types, an intentional shelver or a non-shelver. Moreover, ex
ante non-shelvers may learn over the course of development that they are unintentional
shelvers, facing higher than expected commercialization costs. Licensing to an inten-
tional shelver leads to a sure commercial failure, an outcome the TLO seeks to avoid,
while licensing to an unintentional shelver simply results in a lower probability of com-
mercialization. In this context, our analysis highlights the role played by upfront fees,
continuation payments, and the TLO's option to search for and license to a second ¯rm
when the original licensee fails. An upfront fee matters because any ¯rm that accepts
the contract must pay it, whether or not the ¯rm plans to shelve. Continuation pay-
ments matter when intentional shelving is a problem because, if the original licensee
fails to develop the invention, the TLO can use them to send a credible signal to a
potential second ¯rm regarding the expected quality of the invention. Finally, annual
fees are optimal when unintentional shelving signi¯cantly reduces the probability of
commercialization. They are included in contracts to induce unintentional shelvers to
voluntarily return the license to the TLO.
Notice that the contracting problems we examine are predicated on the split own-
ership implicit in Bayh-Dole, that is, the university owns the invention but the govern-
23ment reserves the right to take it back in the absence of reasonable commercialization
e®ort. We argue that this march-in provision provides the incentive for the univer-
sity to execute separating contracts, so that in equilibrium actual march-in would not
occur.
The university ownership of the invention makes our contracting problems funda-
mentally di®erent from those of Aghion and Tirole [1994a]. In our model the researcher
(inventor) has a moral hazard problem that does not exist in their framework where
either the researcher or the customer (licensee in our case) owns the invention. How-
ever, it is well understood from principal-agent theory that if the agent is risk neutral
and faces no limited liability constraints, the principal can usually fully solve the moral
hazard problem by \selling" the project to the agent and extracting rent with a ¯xed
fee (see, for instance, La®ont [1989]). This solution is reminiscent of a commonly ob-
served practice in university licensing, which consists of letting the inventor start her
own ¯rm to develop and commercialize the invention. An interesting question for fur-
ther research, particularly given increasing commercialization through inventor startup
companies, is when it would be optimal for the university to transfer ownership to the
inventor. This question has also been the topic of debate among a number of European
countries where traditionally ownership has resided with the inventor [OECD 2003].
Another question, currently a point of contention between some ¯rms and universities,
is when the ¯rm funds the research, whether ¯rm ownership is optimal.
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27Appendix
The full information solution
Below we show that the optimal contract the TLO would o®er if it could choose
®, e and X as well as the payment terms (the full information contract) does not
always yield the same outcome as a contract whereby the TLO sells the invention to
the inventor, who then o®ers a contract to the ¯rm.
We focus on cases in which (i) the optimal full information contract leads to posi-
tive e®ort and ¯rm investment and (ii) given the e®ort and investment level that result
from implementing this contract, expected pro¯t from commercialization is su±cient
to cover the investment cost and the inventor's e®ort disutility. This is guaranteed by
the following assumption:
A3: There exists a unique solution (e¤;X¤), e¤ > 0, X¤ > 0, to the following problem
Maximize p(e;X)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ V (e) ¡ X ¡ (1 ¡ p(e;X)z)L
with respect to e ¸ 0 and X ¸ 0. Furthermore, p(e¤;X¤)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ X¤ ¡ V (e¤) > 0.
Note that the e®ort and investment levels that solve the problem in A3 are the
¯rst-best levels in this three-player game. Indeed (e¤;X¤) maximizes the sum of ex-
pected payo®s, which is equal to the expected pro¯t from the invention, minus the
investment and e®ort cost and the expected loss from not commercializing. Hence, A3
is equivalent to assuming that ¯rst-best e®ort and investment levels are positive, and
that expected pro¯t from the invention covers the sum of their cost.
Full information contract
Suppose that the TLO o®ers a contract O = (F;M;A;t;r;X) to the ¯rm and
requires e®ort e from the inventor in exchange for a share ® of licensing revenue. The
TLO chooses O, e and ® to maximize its expected payo® subject to non-negativity
constraints and participation constraints. Without loss of generality, we may assume
M = A = t = r = 0. Since r = t = 0, if the ¯rm accepts the contract, it will invest C
upon commercial success. Then the TLO chooses (F;X), e and ® to maximize
(1 ¡ ®)F ¡ [1 ¡ p(e;X)z]L
subject to
®F ¡ V (e) ¸ 0;
28p(e;X)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ X ¡ F ¸ 0;
and F ¸ 0, ® 2 [0;1], X ¸ 0 and e ¸ 0.
We now show that under A3, setting e = e¤ and X = X¤ is a solution to the
above problem and ®¤ 2 (0;1). Indeed, consider a problem similar to the above but
ignoring the constraints F ¸ 0, ® 2 [0;1], X ¸ 0 and e ¸ 0. In this case, to maximize
expected utility, the TLO will clearly set F = p(e;X)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ X since its expected
payo® is increasing in F. Furthermore, for every (e;X), the TLO's expected payo®
is strictly decreasing in ®. Hence, the TLO will set ® so that ®F ¡ V (e) = 0 or
® =
V (e)
F . Substituting for
V (e)
F in place of ® in the TLO's objective function yields
F¡V (e)¡[1¡p(e;X)z]L. Substituting for F = p(e;X)(z¼¡C)¡X in this last equation
yields p(e;X)(z¼¡C)¡V (e)¡X¡(1¡p(e;X)z)L. Hence, this unconstrained problem
is equivalent to maximizing p(e;X)(z¼¡C)¡V (e)¡X ¡(1¡p(e;X)z)L with respect
to e and X. By assumption A3, the solution to the unconstrained problem is (e¤;X¤).
We also have p(e¤;X¤)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ X¤ > 0 so that F ¤ > 0 and ®¤ =
V (e¤)
p(e¤;X¤)(z¼¡C)¡X¤.
That ®¤ 2 (0;1) follows from the assumption p(e¤;X¤)(z¼ ¡C)¡X¤ ¡V (e¤) > 0 and
e¤ > 0, which implies 0 <
V (e¤)
p(e¤;X¤)(z¼¡C)¡X¤ = ®¤ < 1.
It follows that under assumption A3, the expected payo® to the TLO from o®er-
ing the optimal full information contract is p(e¤;X¤)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ V (e¤) ¡ X ¡ (1 ¡
p(e¤;X¤)z)L, while both the ¯rm and the inventor obtain an expected payo® of 0.
Selling the project to the inventor
Assume A3 holds and suppose now that the TLO o®ers a contract to the inventor
with ® = 1 and a ¯xed price FT to be paid by the inventor. That is, the inventor
gets to keep the entire licensing revenue but must pay an upfront fee to the TLO.
The inventor accepts or rejects the contract. If the inventor rejects the contract, the
optimal full information contract is implemented and the inventor obtains an expected
payo® of zero. If the inventor accepts the contract, she then o®ers a contract to the
¯rm. Importantly, we assume that the inventor's expected payo® is given by
UI( ~ R;e;L) =
½ ~ Rs ¡ V (e) if commercial success;
~ Rf ¡ L ¡ V (e) if commercial failure:
Without loss of generality, assume that the inventor o®ers a contract O = (FI;X) to the
¯rm. The ¯rm's expected payo® from accepting the contract is p(e;X)(z¼¡C)¡X¡FI,
while the inventor's expected payo® is equal to FI ¡V (e)¡FT ¡(1¡p(e;X)z)L. It is
clear that the inventor will set F ¤
I = p(e;X)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ X, so that its expected payo®
29can be written as
p(e;X)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ X ¡ V (e) ¡ FT ¡ (1 ¡ p(e;X)z)L: (1')
Since FT is a lump-sum fee, it will not a®ect the inventor's optimal choice of e and X.
The optimal values of e and X maximize p(e;X)(z¼¡C)¡X¡V (e)¡(1¡p(e;X)z)L¡
FT, where FT is a constant. It is clear that under assumption A3, the solution is given
by (e¤;X¤). The inventor's expected payo® from o®ering an optimal contract to the
¯rm is equal to p(e¤;X¤)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ V (e¤) ¡ X¤ ¡ (1 ¡ p(e¤;X¤)z)L ¡ FT. Hence, the
inventor will be willing to buy the project from the TLO at a positive price, FT ¸ 0, if
and only if p(e¤;X¤)(z¼¡C)¡V (e¤)¡X¡(1¡p(e¤;X¤)z)L ¸ 0. If this last inequality
is satis¯ed, then the TLO sets F ¤
T = p(e¤;X¤)(z¼¡C)¡V (e¤)¡X ¡(1¡p(e¤;X¤)z)L
and earns its expected payo® from the full information contract. Again, the inventor
and the ¯rm earn an expected payo® of zero.
Now it is clear that if p(e¤;X¤)(z¼ ¡ C) ¡ V (e¤) ¡ X ¡ (1 ¡ p(e¤;X¤)z)L < 0, the
inventor will not accept the TLO's sell-out contract unless the TLO o®ers a subsidy
F ¤
T < 0. If the TLO does not o®er a subsidy to the inventor, then the sell-out contract
is not feasible.
Furthermore, if the inventor does not su®er the loss from failing to commercialize,
but instead the TLO does, then the inventor's choice of e and X under the sell-out
contract will generally di®er from (e¤;X¤). This is simply because in this case, the
inventor's objective function does not take the term ¡(1 ¡ p(e;X)z)L into account as
it does in (1').
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that the TLO o®ers a contract O = (F;M;A;t;r) to the ¯rm. If the ¯rm
accepts, then the ¯rm and the inventor play the simultaneous move investment game.
The ¯rm maximizes
p(e;X)(¦[x
¤(r;t);r;t] ¡ A ¡ M) ¡ X ¡ F; (2')
with respect to X, while the inventor maximizes
p(e;X)®( ~ B + A + M) ¡ V (e) + ®F; (3')
with respect to e. In (3'), ~ B is the expected royalty and equity revenue, which depends
on the ¯rm's decision at the commercialization stage. The TLO's expected payo® is
given by
p(e;X)(1 ¡ ®)( ~ B + A + M) + (1 ¡ ®)F ¡ (1 ¡ p(e;X)Z)L;
where the probability of commercial success Z depends on the ¯rm's decision at the
30commercialization stage (Z = z if the ¯rm invests C, while z = zu if the ¯rm does not
invest).
We ¯rst show that the royalty rate will be set equal to zero in an optimal contract
that leads to strictly positive e®ort and investment. To this e®ect note that for any
given contract with strictly positive royalty rate r = r0 > 0, a contract that includes no
output royalty (r = 0), but instead a technical milestone payment M whose amount is
equal to the expected revenue raised by r0, provides identical incentives to the inventor
than the contract with r0. This is because, from (3'), the inventor's expected payo®
depends only on the total expected revenue received upon technical success, ~ B+A+M,
but not on each payment type separately. Since, by de¯nition, milestone payment M
raises the same amount of expected revenue as r0, it is no more costly to the ¯rm
than the royalty payment with rate r0. Furthermore, the milestone payment does not
distort the ¯rm's output and thus, by assumption, the reduction in r will lead to higher
¯rm pro¯t, ie, ¦[x¤(0;t);r;t] > ¦[x¤(r0;t);r;t] for every t < 1 (from ¼ > ¼[x¤(r0;t)]).
Finally, from (2') and (3'), note that the upfront fee has no e®ect on the incentives
to spend e®ort or invest in development. Hence, by setting r = 0 and including a
revenue equivalent milestone payment instead of the royalty r0, the TLO can increase
the upfront fee, while still satisfying the ¯rm's participation constraint. It then obtains
a strictly higher payo®. Hence, r = 0 in an optimal contract.
Setting r = 0, let the expected sum of continuation payments in the contract be
equal to S. That is, S ´ M + A + ~ B, where ~ B depends only on t since r = 0 and the
probability of commercialization. That S > 0 is necessary for strictly positive inventor
e®ort follows naturally from equation (3'). If M + A + ~ B = 0, then the inventor's
expected payo® is equal to ¡V (e) + ®F, and thus, optimal e®ort e¤ = 0 for every X.
Finally, an optimal contract, if one exists, is not unique regarding payment types
because the three risk neutral players' payo® functions depend only on S and on the
upfront fee F, but not on each continuation payment type separately.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the TLO o®ers a contract with A = 0 and an upfront fee equal to the ¯rm's
expected payo®. Then it is clear that both non-shelvers and unintentional shelvers will
keep the license upon technical success. Hence, the greatest amount of revenue the
TLO will be able to extract from the ¯rm is equal to
p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X:
An upfront fee contract in which the upfront fee is set equal to F 0 = p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X
is feasible and raises the greatest amount of revenue. If the TLO o®ers this contract,
31its expected payo® is then equal to
p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X ¡ (1 ¡ p^ z)L: (4')
Now suppose that the TLO o®ers a contract (F;A) where the fee A is to be paid
upon technical success but before commercial success. If the ¯rm accepted the TLO's
contract and the fee A satis¯es A < zu¼, then A has no e®ect on behavior. However,
suppose A ¸ zu¼. Then a ¯rm realizes ex-ante that it will return the license if it ¯nds
out that it is an unintentional shelver. Therefore, ignoring the upfront fee, its expected
payo® from accepting the TLO's contract is equal to pq(¼¡C¡A)¡X. There exists a
contract with A ¸ zu¼ that the ¯rm will accept if and only if pq(¼¡C ¡zu¼)¡X ¸ 0
or zu · ¼¡C
¼ ¡ X
pq¼, where the right-hand side is strictly greater than zero if and only
if q > X
p(¼¡C). Thus, the conditions q > X
p(¼¡C) and zu · ¼¡C
¼ ¡ X
pq¼ are necessary and
su±cient for a contract with A ¸ zu¼ to be accepted by the ¯rm.
Assume that q > X
p(¼¡C) and zu · ¼¡C
¼ ¡ X
pq¼ hold. If the TLO o®ers a contract with
A = zu¼, F can be optimally set equal to pq(¼¡C ¡A)¡X to pick up any remaining
slack in the ¯rm's participation constraint. An unintentional shelver returns the license
after technical success because A ¸ zu¼. Given assumption A1 with s = 0, the TLO
¯nds it pro¯table to search and o®er a contract to a second ¯rm. Furthermore, the
TLO's contract extracts all rents equal to (^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X from that ¯rm. The TLO's
expected payo® from o®ering the contract (F;A) is thus equal to
pq(¼ ¡ C) ¡ X + p(1 ¡ q)(^ z¼ ¡ qC ¡ K) ¡ [1 ¡ pq ¡ p(1 ¡ q)^ z]L: (5')
To show that ^ zu exists, consider the di®erence between (5') and (4'). Note that
limzu#0 ^ z = q. Hence, in the limit as zu goes to zero, this di®erence is equal to
p(1 ¡ q)[q(¼ ¡ C) ¡ K] + p(1 ¡ q)qL > 0;
by assumption A1 (as zu goes to zero). Hence, in the limit as zu goes to zero, the
contract (F;A) yields a strictly higher expected payo® than the contract (F 0). Since
both (5') and (4') are continuous in zu, it follows that the strict inequality will hold
for a range of values of zu that are strictly positive and bounded above by ¼¡C
¼ ¡ X
pq¼.
Therefore, letting A = zu¼ and F = pq(¼ ¡ C ¡ zu¼) ¡ X, we have shown that there
exists a ^ zu > 0 such that the expected payo® from the contract (F;A) is greater than
the expected payo® from the contract (F 0) for all zu 2 (0; ^ zu].
Finally, it is clear that for zu 2 (0; ^ zu], the TLO's optimal contract must contain
an annual fee A ¸ zu¼, but this contract is not unique. The maximum value of the
upfront fee that can be supported is the value of A that solves pq(¼ ¡C ¡A)¡X = 0
or A = (¼ ¡ C) ¡ X
pq = ^ A. Furthermore, equity payments must be su±ciently so as to
32guarantee the ¯rm invests in commercial development. That is, t must be such that
(1¡t)¼¡C ¸ zu¼. All contracts with an annual fee A 2 [zu¼; ^ A], and other payments
set so as to extract all rents from the ¯rm (with the condition t · 1 ¡ C
(1¡zu)¼ on the
equity share) are also optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3
We ¯rst prove the \only if" part of the statement. Note that in a separating equilib-
rium, upon observing a technical failure, the TLO's belief should assign probability
zero to the belief that the ¯rm did not invest. Hence, in equilibrium, the TLO will not
search for a second ¯rm upon technical failure. It follows that a shelver's payo® from
deviating and accepting the contract is equal to ¼m¡F, where F is the upfront fee set in
the contract. The deviation is pro¯table whenever ¼m¡F > (1¡s)p¼d+(1¡(1¡s)p)¼m
or F < (1¡s)pD. Hence, to support the equilibrium F ¸ (1¡s)pD must hold. Since
the maximum upfront fee the TLO can set is ^ F, it follows that ^ F ¸ (1 ¡ s)pD is
necessary to support a separating equilibrium.
To prove the \if" part of the statement, consider the contract O = ( ^ F). We
show that this contract leads to separation, raises strictly more revenue and leads to
a weakly higher probability of commercialization than other separating contracts or
pooling contracts.
That O leads to strictly higher revenue and the same probability of commercial-
ization than other separating contracts follows from the fact that ^ F maximizes the
amount of expected revenue the TLO can extract from non-shelvers. Furthermore, the
probability of commercialization is the same for all separating contracts and is equal
to (1 ¡ s)p + s(1 ¡ s)p.
Consider now a pooling contract O0. If a contract that both non-shelvers and
shelvers accept is to be supported in equilibrium, from Lemma 1, it must be the case
that shelvers shirk. Hence, with O0, the probability of commercialization is no greater
than (1¡s)p+s(1¡s)p, the probability of commercialization that would be obtained if
the TLO was able to license the invention to a second ¯rm upon observing a technical
failure with the ¯rst ¯rm. We now show that with O0, expected revenue cannot possibly
be greater than with O. To this e®ect, we consider two cases. First, suppose that the
TLO cannot pro¯tably license to a second ¯rm upon observing a technical failure. In
this case, the result follows from assumption A1 with q = 1 and ^ z = 1. Indeed, under
O0, the maximum amount of expected revenue that can be raised from the ¯rst ¯rm is
no greater than (1 ¡ s) ^ F + s(1 ¡ s)pD. Therefore, the payo® the TLO can guarantee
itself with O0 is equal to (1¡s) ^ F +s(1¡s)pD¡[1¡(1¡s)p]L. The TLO's payo® from
o®ering O is instead equal to (1¡s) ^ F +s(1¡s)( ^ F ¡K)¡[1¡(1¡s)p¡s(1¡s)p]L.
The di®erence between the TLO's payo® under O0 and its payo® under O is equal to
s(1 ¡ s)(pD ¡ ^ F ¡ pL + K) < 0, where the strict inequality follows from A1.
33Now suppose the TLO is able to license to a second ¯rm upon observing a failure
with the ¯rst ¯rm. In this case, the probability of commercialization under O0 is equal
to (1¡s)p+s(1¡s)p. We now show that expected revenue cannot possibly be greater
than under O. To this e®ect, note that if a non-shelver accepts the TLO's contract
and shirks in technical development, while correctly anticipating that the TLO will
search for a second ¯rm, then the upfront fee must be set equal to zero in O0. Indeed,
a shelver's payo® from rejecting O0 is equal to (1 ¡ s)p¼d + [1 ¡ (1 ¡ s)p]¼m. Its gross
payo® from accepting the contract is also equal to (1 ¡s)p¼d +[1¡(1¡s)p]¼m, since
the shelver fails with probability one. Hence a shelver will accept the contract only if
the upfront fee is equal to zero. Thus, the TLO earns no revenue from a shelver in this
case. Furthermore, the maximum amount of expected revenue that can be extracted
from a non-shelver is equal to ^ F. Because positive revenue can be obtained from a
second ¯rm only if that ¯rm is not a shelver, it follows that the maximum amount of
revenue the TLO can possibly obtain in this case is equal to (1¡s) ^ F +s(1¡s)( ^ F ¡K),
which is equal to expected revenue under O. Hence, we have proven the result.
Proof of Proposition 4
From Proposition 4, a separating contract cannot be supported in equilibrium. Hence
we focus our attention on pooling contracts that both ¯rms accept. Since (4) does
not hold, the project is abandoned following a technical failure. It follows immediately
that a shelver can guarantee itself a payo® of ¼m ¡ F by accepting the contract and
shirking. Hence, a shelver will accept any contract with an upfront fee that satis¯es
F · (1 ¡ s)pD. From the de¯nition of ^ F and the assumption ^ F < (1 ¡ s)pD, it
follows that if the TLO o®ers ^ O = ( ^ F), both shelvers and non-shelvers will accept
the contract. Non-shelvers will invest X, while shelvers will shirk. Since continuation
payments are only paid by non-shelvers, including such payments would strictly lower
the TLO's expected revenue without a®ecting the probability of commercialization.
Hence, it would lower the TLO's expected payo®. Since the maximum upfront fee
non-shelvers are willing to pay is equal to ^ F, o®ering the contract ^ O = ( ^ F) is optimal
and thus, is the unique equilibrium contract.
Proof of Proposition 5
By Lemma 1 and Proposition 4, we focus our attention on pooling equilibria in which
non-shelvers accept and invest X and shelvers accept, but shirk. If such an equilibrium
exists, then given that (3) is satis¯ed by assumption, the TLO cannot commit not to
search for a second ¯rm. We have argued in the text that this implies a constraint on
the upfront fee that the TLO can set in the contract in the form of equation (5). That
is, if an equilibrium exists, the upfront fee is set equal to zero. Now consider a contract
O0 = (M0;A0;t0) in which the upfront fee is set equal to zero and the expected value
34of continuation payments is equal to S0. In equilibrium S0 must satisfy the following
for a non-shelver to accept the contract
p(¼ ¡ C ¡ S
0) ¡ X ¸ 0 () S




and t0 must satisfy (1¡t0)¼¡C ¸ zu¼ or t0 · ^ t, otherwise a non-shelver will prefer not
to invest C in commercial development. Let M0 and A0 denote the technical milestone
payment and the annual fee included in the contract. Since shelvers will not pay equity
shares, there is no loss of generality in assuming that S0 = M0 +A0. That is, the TLO
sets t0 = 0.
Under this contract, a shelver will be indi®erent between rejecting and accepting,
but shirking. However, for the contract to be part of an equilibrium, shelvers must




0) · (1 ¡ s)p¼
d + [1 ¡ (1 ¡ s)p]¼
m () S




Since S¡S > 0 from the assumption ¼¡C > (1¡s)D (which is A2 with q = 1), it
follows that any contract O = (M;A) where M+A = S satis¯es all necessary conditions
for an equilibrium. Furthermore, by extracting an amount of expected revenue equal
to p(¼ ¡ C) ¡ X from non-shelvers, the contract maximizes expected revenue. Since
no other contract could possibly generate a greater probability of commercialization,
O is an equilibrium contract.
Finally, although we ruled out equity shares for simplicity in the ¯rst part of the
proof, it should be clear that any contract in which t · ^ t, S · M + A · S and
p(t¼¡M ¡A¡C)¡X = 0 is a contract that can be supported in equilibrium. Indeed,
this contract is incentive compatible and generates the same expected revenue and the
same probability of success as O.
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the contract O in the statement of Proposition 6. First, note that A = zu¼
implies that an unintentional shelver returns the license to the TLO. However, F = F
implies that, ex-ante, a non-shelver will accept the TLO's contract since it yields an
expected payo® of zero. On the other hand, a shelver's payo® from accepting the
contract is equal to ¼m ¡ F, while its payo® from rejecting is equal to (1 ¡ s)p^ z¼d +
[1 ¡ (1 ¡ s)p^ z]¼m. Under the assumption (1 ¡ s)p^ zD · F, it is easy to see that the
former is less than the latter. Hence a shelver rejects O. It follows that the TLO's
expected payo® from o®ering O and behaving optimally with a potential second ¯rm
35is equal to
(1 ¡ s)fpq(¼ ¡ C) ¡ X + p(1 ¡ q)[(1 ¡ s)(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ K]g
+s(1 ¡ s)[p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X] ¡ sK ¡ [1 ¡ Q]L: (6')
where Q = (1¡s)p[q +(1¡q)(1¡s)^ z]+s(1¡s)p^ z is the probability of successful
commercialization.
Compare the expected payo® in (6') to the expected payo® from o®ering the con-
tract ^ O0 = ( ^ F 0), where ^ F 0 = p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X. This contract clearly maximizes the
TLO's expected payo® in the class of separating contracts that do not induce uninten-
tional shelvers to give back the license. The TLO's expected payo® from o®ering ^ O0 is
equal to:
(1 ¡ s)p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X + s(1 ¡ s)[p(^ z¼ ¡ qC) ¡ X] ¡ sK ¡ [1 ¡ Q
0]L; (7')
where Q0 = (1 ¡ s)p^ z + s(1 ¡ s)p^ z is the probability of commercial success.
In the limit as zu goes to zero, the di®erence between (6') and (7') is equal to
(1 ¡ s)p(1 ¡ q)[(1 ¡ s)q(¼ ¡ C) ¡ K] + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ s)
2qL;
which is strictly positive under assumption A1 (as zu goes to zero).
The proof that a pooling contract cannot possibly provide the TLO with a strictly
higher expected payo® is similar to the second part of the proof of Proposition 3, where






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Timeline of decisions in the game with shelvers.
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